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The fragmentation of the international legal system is not new. The
consent-based nature of international law inevitably led to the creation of
almost as many treaty regimes, composed of different constellations of
states, as there are problems to be dealt with. Traditionally, these differ-
ent regimes operated in virtual isolation from each other. Most
importantly, the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF, and
GATT, now WTO) focused on the world's economic problems, while the
UN institutions tackled the world's political problems. Both the IMF and
World Bank articles of agreement, for example, explicitly state that po-
litical factors cannot be taken into account. Operations are to be based
(e.g. loans are to be distributed) solely on economic grounds (and not,
for example, with reference to a country's human rights or corruption
record).
This separation of spheres was somewhat of a blessing during the
Cold War years when economic deliberations, at least between like-
minded states, could proceed without political infighting. With the end
of the Cold War and the accession of many former communist countries
to the Bretton Woods institutions, the separation was no longer self-
evident. The increased inter-dependence between states and between
issue-areas (e.g., trade and environment, human rights and economic
development) made the strict separation between different fields of in-
ternational law all the more artificial.
The emergence of non-state actors in the international arena (be they
NGOs, companies, or world public opinion) put additional pressure on
government representatives not to deal with problems in isolation. For
example, non-state actors have advocated that governments, when
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regulating international trade, should also take account of what has been
decided at the UN regarding environmental or human rights protection.
These factors-the end of the Cold War and the rise of global inter-
dependence and international NGOs-exerted important pressure toward
a more unitary view of international law. In this sense, there is a relation-
ship between the two phenomena discussed in this symposium: the
emergence of non-state actors has contributed considerably to the forces
acting against the fragmentation of the international legal system.
As a result, what is relatively new is the realization that the different
fields or branches of international law necessarily overlap and that the
resolution of modern problems requires a careful examination of this
interaction. It is no longer possible to resolve, for example, trade ques-
tions de-linked from the problem of environmental protection or the
pursuit of human rights. These interactions require the development of a
unitary framework of international law, one where law-making and law-
enforcement by different, specialized agents can somehow be harmo-
nized into a coherent set of disciplines (not necessarily universally
applicable among all states, but at least coherent as they apply in and
between two specific countries).
At the same time, fragmentation is not necessarily a bad thing, nor
will it disappear anytime soon. Law making and law enforcement by
specialized organizations are likely to lead to better law. Regulatory
competition may increase efficiency and provide a laboratory for the de-
velopment of new legal instruments. Moreover, the diversity of states
means that not all states have the same interests and hence that not all
states will want to, or should, join all treaty-regimes.
What must be avoided, however, is this fragmentation leading to
self-contained islands of international law, de-linked from other branches
of international law. Put differently, the specialized institutions should
continue to make and enforce their specialized law, but in doing so they
should also take account of general international law and the law made
in other institutions (after all, whether the US acts at the WTO or at the
UN, it remains one and the same state). If all fora were to follow this
approach, fragmentation and unity of international law could go hand in
hand and, when it comes to law-enforcement, conflicting rulings could
largely be avoided.
For one institution (say, the WTO) to consider also the law created
by the same states in other institutions (say, in a multilateral environ-
mental agreement, or MEA) flows logically from the principle of pacta
sunt servanda. For example, when the US agrees to a WTO treaty one
day, and the next day it agrees to an MEA, the US acts as one and the
same state (even though it does so in different fora). The WTO should
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not be used as a trade-only safe haven to circumvent MEA obligations
that are, in principle, of equally-binding force between WTO members
that are also party to the MEA.
Construing the WTO as a self-contained, trade-only regime risks cir-
cumvention not only at the international level, but also at the domestic
level, where it would permit powerful domestic pressure groups (read:
multinational companies with strong export interests) to circumvent do-
mestic legal constraints (say, strict environmental regulations) by
insulating their goals and concerns in a trade-only WTO cocoon. Both
avenues for circumvention-at the horizontal, state-to-state level, when
a WTO member circumvents its obligations under non-trade agreements,
and at the vertical level, such as when a multinational company achieves
free trade at the WTO without having to worry about non-trade con-
cerns-go to the heart of the legitimacy and democratic content of
international law.
Let me further develop this bridge between fragmentation and
unity-connecting the different islands or branches of international law
while at the same time respecting the need for specialization and the di-
versity between states-with reference to the WTO and how WTO law
interacts with other branches of international law.
I. THE EXAMPLE OF THE WTO
The problem of fragmentation, and the need for a unitary view of in-
ternational law, is particularly acute at the WTO for three reasons:
(1) claims of violation under the WTO treaty are subject to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body (while
claims under most other treaties are not); (2) many international disputes
have some trade or economic angle so that the disputes, though not ini-
tially or mainly a trade dispute (and hence not subject to compulsory
jurisdiction at first blush), end up before the WTO which then must deal
with questions of overlap or "trade and . . ." issues; and (3) countries in-
creasingly engage in regional or bilateral free trade deals whose
provisions and dispute settlement systems overlap with the multilateral
WTO system.
In actual WTO cases, the U.S. has, for example, defended an import
ban on shrimp with reference to environmental treaties; the EU tried to
justify a ban on hormone-treated beef based on the precautionary princi-
ple; Argentina tried to excuse a statistical import tax with reference to a
memorandum it had concluded with the IMF; and Argentina objected to
a Brazilian complaint before the WTO based on the fact that the same
dispute had already been decided by a MERCOSUR panel.
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Moreover, in the future, it is not hard to imagine a challenge brought
before a WTO panel against trade restrictions imposed or called for by,
as examples, a multilateral environmental agreement, the Kimberley
Scheme banning trade in conflict diamonds, or the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco. One could even imagine a WTO case challeng-
ing trade sanctions imposed or called for by the International Labor
Organization (e.g. against Burma) or pursuant to some human rights
convention. In such an event, in which the WTO complainant can invoke
a breach of WTO law, the defendant could invoke not just GATT excep-
tions but also a defense under one of these non-WTO treaties or
decisions.
II. FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY IN LAW-MAKING
At this juncture, it is useful to distinguish the question of overlap or
potential for conflict between different fields of international law in the
phase of law-making, from conflicts occurring in the phase of law-
enforcement.
Any new rule or treaty of international law is necessarily created
within the wider corpus of pre-existing international law, including pre-
existing treaties, much like any new contract or statute is necessarily
made within the wider context of a domestic legal system. When making
new international law, a crucially important bridge to existing law is the
corpus of general international law, in particular the "tool-box" of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the rules on State Re-
sponsibility. This general international law applies to any new treaty
unless that treaty contracts out of it. If no such contracting-out or lex
specialis is incorporated in the new treaty, one must fall back on the
rules of general international law, be they those on treaty formation,
modification, or amendment, or rules on standing, burden of proof, or
remedies. In this sense, general international law is a crucially important
element of coherence and unity between different treaty regimes. As fur-
ther explained below, we have witnessed this procedure of fallback on
general international law on numerous occasions in WTO dispute set-
tlement.
In addition, any treaty, new or old, interacts with other treaties, at
least in relations between countries that are parties to both. Although
treaties may be ratified by the same states, they are often negotiated and
drafted by different people or constituencies within those states (e.g.,
trade ministry versus the foreign affairs department; health ministry ver-
sus ministry of agriculture). In the event of tension between treaties,
there is, first of all, a presumption against conflict. Put differently, when
[Vol. 25:903
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a treaty leaves room for interpretation, an attempt must be made to read
it in a way harmonious with other treaties (at least those treaties reflect-
ing the common intentions of the parties to the first treaty). This is called
for explicitly in Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties: when interpreting a treaty, one must take account of "any rele-
vant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties."
In some cases, however, the tension between treaties cannot be "in-
terpreted away" and a genuine conflict arises. In my book on Conflict of
Norms in Public International Law,' I identified the following as the
most important problems in this respect:
1. When are two norms of international law, as they apply between
two states, in conflict with each other? In my view, conflict arises not
only when faced with two mutually exclusive obligations. Conflict may
also arise between an obligation to do X under one norm (say, to liberal-
ize trade) and an explicit right not to do X under another (say,
permission to ban a particular import under an environmental treaty).
2. Some conflicts of norms lead to the end of one of the two norms:
i.e., because of the conflict, one of the two norms is invalid, terminated,
or 'illegal'. I call this type of conflict inherent normative conflict. A
norm in conflict with jus cogens, for example, is void under Articles 53
and 64 of the Vienna Convention. One treaty, without stating so explic-
itly, may terminate another (Art. 59 Vienna Convention). In addition, an
inter se agreement between a limited number of, for example, WTO
members, may be explicitly prohibited or otherwise illegal under a pre-
existing and broader multilateral agreement (in casu, the WTO treaty),
especially if the inter se agreement "affects the enjoyment by the other
parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obliga-
tions" as described in Articles 34 and 41 of the Vienna Convention. In
other words, an inter se agreement is illegal if it affects the rights or ob-
ligations of WTO members not party to the inter se agreement.
Whether, for example, an environmental treaty between some (but
not all) WTO members is 'legal' under the WTO treaty will, therefore,
depend on whether the trade restrictions permitted or imposed under the
environmental treaty necessarily affect all WTO members (including
those not party to the environmental treaty) or only those WTO members
that agreed to the environmental treaty. The answer to this question de-
pends, in turn, on the nature of WTO obligations: are they of the
collective/integral/erga omnes partes-type, or essentially a bundle of
bilateral relationships, making it possible to alter one bilateral relation-
1. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 passim (2003).
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ship between two WTO members without affecting other WTO mem-
bers? In my view, most, if not all, WTO obligations remain of the
bilateral type. 2 As a result, other, non-WTO treaties, even if they are con-
cluded only between some WTO members, may reinstate specific trade
restrictions, as long as these restrictions do not affect the rights of other
WTO members.
3. Other conflicts of norms leave both norms intact, but priority
rules must be used to decide which norm applies in a particular situa-
tion. One and the same set of facts may trigger the application of two
conflicting norms. If these two norms are both valid and legal, the ques-
tion is one of priority: which norm prevails? I term this type of conflict,
conflict in the applicable law.
No inherent hierarchy exists of the sources of international law (e.g.,
treaties do not necessarily prevail over custom or vice versa). To resolve
the conflict, therefore, recourse must be had to (1) explicit conflict rules
in either treaty (e.g., NAFTA Art. 104 stating that certain environmental
agreements prevail over NAFTA); and, in the absence of such explicit
rules, (2) conflict rules of general international law, the most important
being the lex posterior principle in Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention. Lex
specialis as a general conflict rule was not explicitly incorporated in the
Vienna Convention. Still, in my view, it must be resorted to in case the
lex posterior principle is not or cannot be invoked. Lex posterior, or the
rule that a later treaty prevails over an earlier one, is based on the domes-
tic law idea that the more recent expression of 'legislative intent'
controls. In international law, this idea does not always work. It may be
difficult to put one single time-label on a particular treaty (re-negotiation
and subsequent accession by certain states may complicate matters).
Moreover, when it comes to multilateral treaties that set up a regulatory
framework or system which continuously evolves and is continuously
(re)confirmed, adapted, expanded and interpreted, it is difficult to freeze
such a treaty at the moment when it was originally created and to label it
simply as an expression of state consent limited to, say, 15 April 1994 in
the case of the WTO agreement. Rather, I suggest calling this type of
treaty "continuing" or "living' treaties" because it is most often impos-
sible or purely fictitious to say that they are later or earlier in time
compared to another treaty. Since the lex posterior principle cannot be
applied (there are no 'successive treaties' to begin with), I suggest to re-
sort in those cases to the principle of lex specialis. In many instances, the
more general WTO rule (say, the general prohibition on import quotas)
then must give way to, for example, a more specific obligation or right to
2. See Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obli-
gations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 5 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 907 (2003).
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impose a ban on a particular product pursuant to an environmental
agreement.
In exceptional situations of conflict, none of the above rules may of-
fer a way out. In that case, I would not rule out a non liquet, i.e., a ruling
not so much that there is no law, but that there is too much law and that it
cannot be resolved which of the conflicting norms applies.
4. One particular type of conflict is especially problematic, namely
a conflict between two treaties where only one of the two countries is
bound by both, the other country being a party only to one of the treaties.
I call this conflict of the "AB/AC" type: country A promising one thing
to country B; but thereafter or elsewhere promising the same thing or a
contradictory thing to country C. In old examples, A would cede a par-
ticular territory first to B, then to C, resulting in conflicting claims in the
hands of B and C. More recent cases are embodied in the following ex-
ample: A promising to B at the WTO not to restrict trade, after which A
agrees with C that all trade in, for example, CFKs or conflict diamonds,
including those from third parties (in casu, country B), must be banned.
This may lead to conflict from the perspective of country A: should it
comply with its obligations vis-A-vis B not to restrict trade, or should it
comply with its obligations vis-A-vis C to restrict trade? Making a choice
necessarily violates the rights of either B or C.
International law offers no conflict rules for this type of conflict, not
even priority rules. However, the rules on state responsibility continue to
apply: if A decides to restrict trade and thereby violates the WTO rights
of B, country B can claim at least compensation or retaliation rights at
the WTO (certainly against country A, and arguably also against country
C, if country C is also a WTO member). However, if A thereafter decides
to withdraw the trade restriction on B, it will violate its obligations vis- -
vis country C under the environmental/conflict diamonds treaty. In the
end, this impasse can only be resolved by re-negotiating either or both
treaties, for example, or by country B joining the environmental agree-
ment (perhaps in exchange for greater market access to countries A and
C).
III. FRAGMENTATION AND UNITY IN LAW-ENFORCEMENT
In principle, there should be no difference between how norms inter-
act in the abstract and how they interact, or how conflict ought to be
resolved, before a particular adjudicator. Nonetheless, while most would
agree with the evaluation in the section above on law-making, when it
comes to practical law-enforcement, many object to, for example, WTO
panels taking account also of non-WTO law. In my view, this reticence is
Summer 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
based on a widespread confusion between three concepts or processes
that any court or tribunal engages in. The scope of the legal rules that
each of these three processes covers varies considerably. To confuse one
process with the other may, therefore, lead to unjustified restrictions on
the extent to which, for example, a WTO panel can consider non-WTO
law. The three concepts or processes I have in mind, as applied to WTO
dispute settlement, are:
1) The jurisdiction of WTO panels: the WTO panels are limited
to claims of violation of WTO agreements only.
2) The law that WTO panels can refer to when interpreting
WTO provisions: in the process of treaty interpretation, WTO
panels may be called upon to refer to non-WTO rules of in-
ternational law pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention, in particular, Article 31.3(c) referring to "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties." In my view, the non-WTO rules that
may thereby be referred to in the process of interpreting WTO
terms is limited to those non-WTO rules reflecting the com-
mon intentions of all WTO members.
3) The law that WTO panels may apply when examining and de-
ciding on the validity of the WTO claims before them:
although the jurisdiction of WTO panels is limited to WTO
claims, in my view, all international law binding on both par-
ties to a dispute may, in principle, be part of the applicable
law before a WTO panel. Non-WTO law is part of this appli-
cable law, and may, in particular, provide a defense against
violation of WTO law (for example, an environmental agree-
ment binding between the disputing parties may, depending
on the relevant conflict rules, excuse a violation of GATT, in-
dependently of GATT Article XX). While non-WTO law to
be referred to when interpreting WTO terms ought to be lim-
ited to law that reflects the common intentions of all WTO
members, in my view, the applicable law in a particular dis-
pute may also include law binding only between the two
disputing parties (it need not be binding on all WTO mem-
bers).
The best way to explain the difference between jurisdiction, treaty
interpretation, and applicable law is to give some examples.
[Vol. 25:903
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A. Jurisdiction Versus Applicable Law
The difference between jurisdiction and applicable law is well
known and accepted in other international courts and tribunals,3 though
often neglected at the WTO. Making an analogy to the limited jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Lockerbie cases
decided by the ICJ constitute a perfect illustration. There, the ICJ had
jurisdiction to consider Libyan claims only under the Montreal Conven-
tion. However, this did not stop it from also examining other
international law, in particular UN Security Council Resolution 748 in-
voked in defense by the United Kingdom and the United States, as part
of the applicable law.4
Non-WTO law invoked as part of the applicable law before a WTO
panel may, therefore, constitute a self-standing defense on the merits
(e.g., the Kimberley Scheme on conflict diamonds constituting a defense
against a claim of violation of GATT, at least between WTO members
party to the Kimberley scheme). In that case, a WTO and a non-WTO
rule of international law may both apply to the case at hand. If they con-
flict, the conflict rules elaborated above must be applied. The result is
that either the non-WTO rule is invalid/illegal (inherent normative con-
flict) or that it is valid and legal and a conflict in the applicable law
arises. Based on the priority rules explained earlier, either the WTO rule
or the non-WTO rule should then prevail. If the WTO rule prevails and it
is violated, the panel must then find a violation of WTO law. If the non-
WTO rule prevails and it justifies a WTO violation, the panel must reject
the claim of violation of WTO law.
3. As most recently noted by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Mox Plant dispute (under
Annex VII of UNCLOS): "The Tribunal agrees ... that there is a cardinal distinction between
the scope of its jurisdiction ... on the one hand, and the law to be applied by the Tribunal...
on the other hand." MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003) (Order No.
3,June 24, 2003, at para. 19), at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/MOX%200rder%20no3.pdf.
Compare the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter 11 of NAFTA:
Arts. 1116-17 of NAFTA, entitled "Claim by an Investor of a Party... limits the jurisdic-
tion of NAFIA arbitration tribunals to claims of violation of Section A of NAFTA Chapter 11
and NAFTA Arts. 1503(2) and 1502(3)(a); in contrast, Art. 1131 of NAFTA, entitled "Govern-
ing Law," sets out the broader scope of the applicable law to be considered in examining the
validity of those enumerated NAFTA claims ("A Tribunal established under this Section shall
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this [entire] Agreement and applicable rules of
international law") (emphasis added). North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). Compare also Art. 288 (jurisdiction) to Art. 293 (applicable law) of
UNCLOS. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
4. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Aris-
ing from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Provisional
Measures of Apr. 14, para. 42).
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Less dramatically, non-WTO law is also commonly applied to fill
largely procedural gaps in the WTO agreement. The WTO agreement is
silent on questions such as burden of proof, standing, representation be-
fore panels, the retroactive application of treaties, and error in treaty
formation. As a result, panels have applied the rules of general interna-
tional law addressing those questions, essentially custom or general
principles of law binding on all states.5
Finally, non-WTO law to be applied by WTO panels can also un-
dermine the jurisdiction of a WTO panel when, for example, the non-
WTO law reserves exclusive jurisdiction to another court or tribunal to
deal with the dispute at hand, or provides that once a dispute has been
decided under a regional trade deal, it cannot be brought a second time
to the WTO. Both NAFTA and MERCOSUR set out provisions along
those lines. If a WTO member were, nonetheless, to bring the same dis-
pute a second time to the WTO, in my view a WTO panel should apply
the relevant NAFTA/MERCOSUR provision and decide that, based on
the agreement between the parties, it does not have jurisdiction (techni-
cally speaking the WTO rule on jurisdiction ought then give way to the
NAFTA/MERCOSUR rule on jurisdiction on the ground that the latter is
later in time or more specific than the former).
A similar tension between E.C. courts and an arbitral tribunal under
UNCLOS materialized more recently in the Mox Plant case (Ireland v.
United Kingdom). In that dispute, Ireland submitted claims of violation
under UNCLOS concerning discharges into the Irish sea of radioactive
waste by a new processing plant (the so-called Mox Plant) built by the
United Kingdom close to the Irish border. In an Order on Provisional
Measures dated December 3, 2001, the International Tribunal on the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) found that it had prima facie jurisdiction under
Article 288.1 of UNCLOS.6 Subsequently, an Arbitral Tribunal was con-
stituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS to decide the merits of the case.
The Tribunal decided, in contrast to the finding of ITLOS, to suspend its
proceedings by order on June 24, 2003. It did so mainly in response to
arguments by the United Kingdom that the dispute fell within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of E.C. courts pursuant to Article 292 of the E.C. Treaty.
The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view that the question of whether and
what aspects of the UNCLOS dispute fall under the exclusive jurisdic-
5. For an overview of relevant case law, see James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Princi-
ples of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 248
(2001). See also Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. INT'L. L. 535, 563 (2001); Meinhard Hilf, Power Rules and Princi-
ples-Which Orientation for WTO/GATTaw?, 4 J. INT'L. ECON. L. I1 (2001).
6. MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Int'l. Trib. for the L. of the Sea 2001)
(Order of 3 December 2001), at http://www.itlos.org (Case No. 10).
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tion and competence of the European Communities is a question "to be
decided within the institutions of the European Communities, and par-
ticularly by the European Court of Justice."7 Hence, the Arbitral Tribunal
considered it inappropriate to continue its proceedings "in the absence of
a resolution of the problems referred to" within the context of the E.C.8
Interestingly, the order did so "bearing in mind considerations of mutual
respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions
both of which may be called upon to determine rights and obligations as
between two States," noting that "a procedure that might result in two
conflicting decisions on the same issue would not be helpful to the reso-
lution of the dispute between the Parties."9
This order to suspend UNCLOS proceedings based on provisions in
another agreement (here, the E.C. Treaty) is in line with the approach
that this author would suggest for WTO panels. WTO panels, as well,
ought to take cognizance of other agreements in which the disputing par-
ties may have stripped the WTO of jurisdiction to deal with particular
cases.
B. Jurisdiction Versus Treaty Interpretation
Notwithstanding the limited jurisdiction of WTO panels (WTO
claims only), it has become standard practice for WTO panels and the
Appellate Body to use non-WTO law when interpreting the meaning of
terms in the WTO agreement. Such interpretation can, for example, lead
to broader GATT exceptions, as in US-Shrimp, where the Appellate
Body interpreted the words "exhaustible natural resources" in GATT
Article XX(g) with reference to certain environmental treaties.' ° It may
also narrow the scope of GATT rules or exceptions, as shown in the Oil
Platforms, where a treaty provision similar to GATT Article XXI(b)(iii)
7. See MOX Plant supra note 3, at 8, para. 26. The European Commission actually
initiated infringement procedures under the E.C. Treaty against Ireland claiming that Ireland's
initiation of the Mox Plant case under UNCLOS (as well as the OSPAR Convention) violates
Ireland's obligations under the EC Treaty. Ireland Threatened over Sellafield Row, THE INDE-
PENDENT, June 29, 2003, at I.
8. See MOX Plant, supra note 3, at 9, para. 38.
9. Id.
10. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WTr/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VI 2755, 1 128-132 (1998) [here-
inafter US-Shrimp]. On the process of interpreting the WTO treaty with reference to non-
WTO law, see Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law-Praises for the
Prohibition Against 'Clinical Isolation'in WTO Dispute Settlement, J. WORLD TRADE 87 pas-
sim, Oct. 1999. See also PAUWELYN, supra note 1, at 244-74 (discussing treaty interpretation
as a conflict-avoidance tool).
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on essential security interests was interpreted restrictively with reference
to rules of general international law prohibiting the use of force."
In Oil Platforms, the interaction was between Article XX: I(d) of the
Iran-US Treaty of Amity of 1955 (permitting "measures necessary to
protect essential security interests of a party") and general international
law rules prohibiting the use of force, in particular rules regarding self-
defense. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) only had jurisdiction to
examine claims under the Treaty of Amity. Yet, when deciding on those
claims, i.e., when interpreting the Treaty of Amity, the ICJ did refer to
general international law rules on the use of force. The questions were,
more specifically, whether US attacks on Iranian oil platforms could be
justified as "measures necessary to protect essential security interests" of
the United States, in line with Article XX:I(d), and whether, in the
examination of this first question, general international law rules on the
use of force played a role. The ICJ decided to interpret Article XX: 1(d)
with reference to rules on the use of force (invoking Article 31.3(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in support), found that the
US attacks were not justified under those rules as acts of self-defense,
and, on that basis, concluded that the US attacks could not be seen as
"necessary to protect essential security interests" of the United States. In
the end, however, this lack of justification under Article XX: 1(d) did not
play a role since the ICJ later decided that the US attacks did not breach
the 1955 Treaty of Amity in the first place (hence there was no need to
justify US conduct under Article XX: 1 (d) to begin with).
Based on the above distinctions, the role of non-WTO law before a
WTO panel can be summarized as follows:
11. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003 I.C.J.
90 (November 6), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iopfiopjudgment/iop-ijudgment-
20031106.PDF.
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WTO Other WTO General Norms Norms
Covered Law International Binding on Binding
Agreements Law and both on only
Norms Disputing one of the







JURISDICTION Yes No No No No
(to examine claims
under these rules)
APPLICABLE LAW Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(to be applied in the
examination of WTO
claims)




Valid DEFENCE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
against a WTO claim
CLAIMS ENFORCED Yes No No No No
under these rules if
they prevail as the
applicable law
IV. CONCLUSION
Because it is largely consent-based, international law is fragmented.
A wide range of different treaty regimes and courts and tribunals exist.
This is not necessarily a bad thing. Crucially, however, these different
islands of international law must be inter-connected and considered in
unison through the prism of general international law.
Both in the abstract and before a particular adjudicator, current in-
ternational law provides ways to marry the different branches of
international law. Especially before a particular court or tribunal, it is
important to include all international law binding between the parties as
part of the applicable law, even if the jurisdiction of the adjudicator is
limited to a given treaty (say, WTO covered agreements). If all courts
and tribunals follow this approach, it would mean that, although they
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may have jurisdiction to examine different claims, in so doing they
would apply the same law. Hence, in theory, no conflict should arise.
At the same time, it remains possible that two different judges would
come to different conclusions based on the same law. This can never be
avoided completely and, much like the phenomenon of fragmentation,
may even have positive side effects: through competition the best inter-
pretation is likely to surface. The risks of conflicting rulings on the same
law can, moreover, be mitigated considerably through judicial coopera-
tion, be it in the form of preliminary rulings, advisory opinions, requests
for information or expert advice or one tribunal taking account of the
rulings and precedents of others. This is already happening at the WTO
(for example: WTO panels requesting advice from the WHO or WIPO,
the Appellate Body referring to ICJ judgments, etc.).
The theory explored here for the WTO can be transposed to other re-
gimes of international law. Thinking of international law in this way, as a
universe of inter-connected islands, should go a long way toward bridg-
ing the conflicting realities of both fragmentation and unity in modern
international law.
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